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MULTICULTURALISM AS METAPHOR
Linda S. Greene*
INTRODUCTION

How ironic that the meaning of a single word-multiculturalism-has come to embody both transformative hope as well as deepseated fear. Multiculturalism certainly sums up the hope and the
aspiration for an inclusive principle that would transcend the limits
of formal equality and jettison traditional race and gender power
relationships. And, not surprisingly, the multiculturalism debate has
also begun to raise questions about the future structure of relationships among groups. The symbolic dimension of multiculturalism
and its potential unbounded content evoke fear that the traditions
and assumptions of the existing order are at risk.
Multiculturalism is the ultimate soundbite. It embodies not only
a claim of inclusion. It is also metaphor for the opposition to institutional rules that reframe in meritocratic terms the historical exclusion of people of color and women. It is metaphor for the demand
for a reconceptualization of the "public" as heterogeneous, not homogenous and assimilated. It is also metaphor for an idea of inclusion that transcends formal equality and narrow conceptions of legal
remediation. The power of multiculturalism may flow from the
emergence of the word at a historical point at which the opposition
to the greater inclusion of historically disempowered groups has
achieved clear legal legitimacy.' Understood this way, multicul* Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School. J.D., University of California at
Berkeley (Boalt Hall), 1974.
I. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989) ("IT]he standard
of review under the Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or
benefitted by a particular classification."); id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The benign purpose of compensating for social disadvantages, whether they have been acquired by reason of prior
discrimination or otherwise, can no more be pursued by the illegitimate means of racial discrimination than can other assertedly benign purposes we have repeatedly rejected."); cf Metro Broad-'
casting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3028 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia and Kennedy, J.J.) (deriding majority's approval of FCC race-based
remedial measures in award of broadcast licenses). Confirmation of Justice Thomas, while narrowly achieved, was significant on this point in light of his historical opposition to affirmative
action. He was not really challenged on these views by the Senate Judiciary Committee. This
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turalism symbolizes so much more than a rotating series of cultural
awareness days or festivals. Like the 1960s Black Power cry,2 it is
an utterance that places the existing order symbolically at risk.
In this paper I examine the relationship between the core claim of
inclusion, which multiculturalism represents, and legal doctrine.
First, I suggest that the cry for multiculturalism comes just as the
legal foundation for more inclusive institutions seems to be crumbling. The Supreme Court has limited the scope of constitutional
equality and has created a normative vacuum-a field on which individuals and groups compete for influence. Against this background, multiculturalism should be understood as a demand for discourse-democratization and a plea for access to- those institutions
that will shape future norms. Moreover, I suggest that, among other
things, multiculturalism has become the loose appellation that
might characterize diverse claims to participate as power-sharers in
existing institutions.' Finally, I discuss one of the most attentiongetting attacks on multiculturalism, the charge that multiculturalism is simply an effort to censor and limit an open dialogue on questions of race and gender-that multiculturalism is simply a demand
for "political correctness."" I conclude that the framing of the debate over inclusion in terms of multiculturalism-aseither slogan
or epithet-adds little to our understanding of the complexity of
outsider claims for inclusion or the institutional implications of taking those claims seriously. The implications of multiculturalism are
numerous, and yet the packaging of the debate over it contributes
little to a debate over a post-Brown order of inclusion. If legal doctrine has reached its limits in terms of facilitating a "new world
order" of inclusion, perhaps it is all the more important that a wide
opposition wears a powerful cloak of legitimacy because it is framed in terms of the same equality
principles that historically disempowered groups have invoked in support of inclusion. The Croson
majority's rejection of the idea that measures of inclusion ought to be generously viewed is an
important symbolic victory for those who fear a reallocation of resources. Croson accords existing
racially identified distributions constitutional legitimacy and places a heavy burden on those who
desire a redistribution of resources.
2. STOKELY CARMICHAEL & CHARLES V. HAMILTON, BLACK POWER: THE POLITICS OF LIBERATION IN AMERICA (1967).
3. The variety of essays on multiculturalism compiled in the book DEBATING P.C.: THE CONTROVERSY OVER POLITICAL CORRECTNESS ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES

(Paul Berman ed., 1992)

[hereinafter DEBATING P.C.] is evidence of the diverse understandings of the meaning and implications of multiculturalism.
4. See Dinesh D'Souza & Robert MacNeil, The Big Chill? Interview with Dinesh D'Souza, in
DEBATING P.C., supra note 3, at 29, 32 ("[Critical examination does not . . .take place ...
[because] non-Western classics are politically incorrect.") [hereinafter D'Souza, Interview].
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diversity of "empowered" voices participate in the creation of
knowledge that might ground a resolution of inclusion claims.
Whatever multiculturalism may "mean," it has become a symbol, a
"soundbite" preempting meaningful discussion of the conditions
under which groups might share authority with respect and without
subordination.
1.

MULTICULTURALISM AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF
NORMATIVE VACUUMS AND NORMATIVE' CHAOS

A.

Introduction

The Court-created dichotomy between the judicially enforceable
scope of constitutional equality and the legislatively enforceable
scope of statutory equality creates a normative vacuum. The result
is unlimited opportunity for norm contests that are relatively unbounded by constitutional parameters. Consequently, the currency
of current struggles for inclusion is possession of the means in which
opinion-political, public-is formulated. The claim of inclusion
with respect to institutions that participate in the norm-generation
process is especially powerful. For if the next phase of "equality"
norm formulation is unaided by reference to transformative legal
principles, democratic principles would suggest that new norms
might be legitimate if and only if they are generated in a process in
which all perspectives and experiences have been considered. In my
view, the cry for multiculturalism symbolizes the quest for the replacement of traditional republicanism's "commitment to a unified
public that in practice tends to.exclude or silence some groups" 5
with "the heterogeneous public." 6
B.

Brown 7 to McCleskey 8 and Beyond-The Court's Refusal
To Articulate a Transformative Vision

The failure of the Supreme Court to articulate a normative vision
in support of racial and gender transformation has created a normative gap in which a contest exists for domination of the norm-formulation process. Though our history of a formal embrace of equality
is over one hundred years old, our history of trying to make consti5. IRIS M. YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 183 (1990).

6. Id. at 183-84.
7. Brown v. Board'of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
8. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
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tutional equality promises a reality is much shorter, either forty
years if one counts from Brown 19 or barely twenty years if one
counts from the important constitutional remedies decision Swann 0
or the important federal employment discrimination decision
Griggs." Against this short background, the question of who participates in the shaping of knowledge assumes even greater importance.
If we concede that in the past certain groups had almost no access
to the processes in which knowledge is denominated authoritative,
how do we continue to rationalize a future in which there might be
no concession on the questions of institutional democratization? The
demand to participate that multiculturalism represents is challenge
to a past in which a limited number of people participated in the
process of deciding what ought to count as authoritative. The question of limited participation, always an issue that raised important
questions about the legitimacy of our institutions, assumes even
greater importance if key questions about the contours of equality
remain to be resolved. And, given doctrinal developments to date,
key questions do remain.
Neither Brown nor subsequent Supreme Court decisions explicitly
articulated a doctrinal vision that would place judicially enforceable
constitutional law at the forefront of racial transformation. In
Brown, the Court did not choose to condemn the history of segregation and its rationales. Rather, the Court focused upon the effects of
segregation of young black children. 2 Nonetheless, Brown antiapartheid principles contained great potential, especially in the clear
suggestion that the effects of government policy were much more
important than its motivations. But until Washington v. Davis,1" the
contours of post-Brown equality seemed fuzzy indeed, and the Court
did not articulate a consistent principle to guide its decisions during
the resistance to Brown's letter and spirit. 4 When, in Davis, the
9. Brown, 347 U.S. at 483 (overturning "separate but equal" doctrine).
10. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (supporting broad remedial powers of federal district courts in school desegregation cases).
11.Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (holding that Title VII bars discrimination
manifested in facially neutral policies that disparately impact protected classes).
12. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493-95 (relying on the "feeling of inferiority" visited upon black children in holding that educational segregation violates the Equal Protection Clause).
13. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
14. See Crawford v. Board of Educ., 458 U.S. 527 (1982) (state constitutional provision forbidding courts to bus except when Federal Constitution so requires); Washington v. Seattle Sch.
Dist., 458 U.S. 457 (1982) (statute forbidding busing unless approved at state board level);
Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971) (public swimming pools closed in response to order to
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Court was asked to consider whether a facially neutral government
policy that had a racially disparate impact was constitutional, it did
so against the background of its own ambivalence about the scope of
Brown. When the Court decided that the judicially enforceable
Fourteenth Amendment would be limited to provable, intentional,
conscious, racially motivated state action, it limited the scope of the
judicial enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment to formal equality1" and thus limited the judiciary's role in the process of postBrown racial transformation. Subsequent judicial events, including
the McClesky v. Kemp'" case in which the Court declined to consider a claim of racial discrimination in the imposition of the death
penalty unless the inmate facing a death sentence could show that
the state intentionally maintained the death penalty system to execute more blacks, and City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 7 in
which the Court agreed to apply the most rigorous level of judicial
scrutiny to state and local government affirmative action programs,
suggest that the Court has unequivocally embraced a nontransformative role. 8 At the same time, in Davis, the Supreme Court
announced a legislative alternative to a significant judicial transformative role. The Court said that "extension of the [disparate impact rule] beyond those areas where it is already applicable by reason of statute . . .should await legislative prescription." ' 9
What are the substantive and process limitations on the exercise
of this legislative authority? Congress has relied upon the Commerce Clause,20 the Thirteenth Amendment, 2 the Fourteenth
desegregate Jackson, Mississippi, recreation facilities); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967)
(legislature forbidden by state constitution to pass fair housing legislation); Griffin v. County Sch.
Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (schools closed in response to desegregation order).
15. Davis, 426 U.S. at 239.
16. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
17. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
18. See also Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); Martin v. Wilks, 490
U.S. 755 (1989); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989). These statutory civil
rights decisions, and others, were overruled by the Congress in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.
L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at scattered sections of U.S.C.).
19. Davis, 426 U.S. at 248; see also Linda S. Greene, Twenty Years of Civil Rights: How Firm
a Foundation?, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 707, 745-49 (1985) (criticizing the Davis court's delegation
to the legislature).
20. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 255 (1964) (finding Commerce Clause authorized application of Title i of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to public accommodation serving interstate travel); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 298 (1964) (same
where public accommodation served food that had moved in interstate commerce).
21. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437 (1968) (upholding Section 1982
proscription of discrimination in sale or rental of real property as authorized by the Thirteenth
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Amendment,22 the Spending Clause, 23 and the respective enforcement clauses 4 of these constitutional provisions as authority for
equality-enforcing legislation. The general principle applicable to
each of these acts of legislative authority is the understanding that
the enforcement clauses confer upon Congress discretion to determine which rules are rationally related to the enforcement of the
norms embodied in these constitutional provisions25 and that the
court will not second-guess these decisions.26 However, the Court's
decision to limit its own statement of constitutional principle to governmental decisions that show provable, consciously race-based decision-making leaves to Congress and state legislatures a wide-ranging
legislative authority. The result is a debate without boundary norms,
a debate in which all comers compete to shape principles.
C.

Legislative Politics

The debate over the meaning of "business necessity" in the course
of Congress's consideration of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("1991
Act")27 is a poignant example of normative chaos in the context of
equality legislation. One of the most important purposes of the 1991
Act was the clarification of the status of Griggs v. Duke Power
Co. 8 after the 1989 Supreme Court decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.29 So important was this objective, the purposes
clause of the legislation included the mention of both cases by
Amendment); see also Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat.
1619 (codified at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
22. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (upholding the Voti.ng Rights Act as
within Congress' Fourteenth Amendment Section Five powers).
23. See, e.g., Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 599 (1983) (White, J.,
concurring) (referring to Title Vi" of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as "Spending Clause
legislation").
24. See, e.g., Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 649-51.
25. Certainly, significant judicial checks will be applied if a state or the Congress employs a
race-conscious means to accomplish an equality objective. In Croson, five Justices agreed that
strict scrutiny was the proper standard to be applied to race-based remedial measures, at least at
the state or local level. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1988)
(opinion of O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White, J.); id. at 519 (opinion of Kennedy, J.); id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasizing that state and local remedies should
almost always receive strict scrutiny).
26. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1984) (overruling
"traditional governmental functions" exception to Congress's broad Commerce Clause authority).
27. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified at scattered sections of U.S.C.).
28. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
29. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
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name.3 1 In addition, the legislation explicitly attempted to confine
the legislative history of the phrase business necessity to a specific
page of the congressional record. 81 In spite of these efforts, Senator
Robert Dole introduced a memorandum into the record after the
language of the bill had been agreed upon asserting that no agreement had been reached on the precise meaning of business necessity.
In support of his assertion of normative flux, Senator Dole inserted
in the record the numerous formulations of business necessity that
at one time or another had been proposed to the Congress during its
lengthy consideration of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and its predecessor, the Civil Rights Act of 1990.2 The battle over the scope of
the Griggs principle is an example of the unbounded nature of the
legislative debate over the definition of equality. In such an unbounded debate, the existence of a contest over competing ideals depends upon the participation of groups with diverse and divergent
interests in the outcome. Imagine the content of the Griggs-Wards
Cove discussion without the participation of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights 3 and the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund.34
30. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3(2), 105 Stat. 1071, 1071.
31. Id. § 105(b), 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(3)(b) (1988 &
Supp. 1111991)) ("No statements other than the interpretive memorandum appearing at Vol. 137
Congressional Record S 15276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) shall be considered legislative history of,
or relied upon in any way as legislative history in construing or applying, any provision of this Act
that relates to Wards Cove-Business necessity/cumulation/alternative business practice.").
32. Dole Interpretative Memorandum, 137 CONG. REC. S15,472-75 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991).
In addition, President Bush included a reference to the Dole Memorandum in his own statement
on signing the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See Statement on Signing the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
29 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1701 (Nov. 21, 1991). For a political history of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, see generally Reginald C. Govan, Framing Issues and Acquiring Codes: An Overview of the Legislative Sojourn of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 1057 (1992).
33. The Leadership Conference on Civil Rights was founded in 1950 by A. Philip Randolph,
Roy Wilkins, and Arnold Aaronson to implement the historic report of President Truman's Commission on Civil Rights To Secure These Rights. The Leadership Conference is composed of 185
national organizations that represent minority groups, labor unions, women, religious groups, the
disabled, and older Americans. It is committed to an integrated, democratic, plural society in
which every individual is accorded equal rights, equal opportunities, and equal justice without
regard to race, sex, religion, ethnic origin, handicap, or age. Among other things, the Leadership
Conference lobbies Congress to pass civil rights legislation that will implement its goals. Telephone Interview with Karen McGill Arrington, Policy Research Associate, Leadership Conference
on Civil Rights, Washington, D.C. (June 8, 1992).
34. In an amicus brief filed in the Metro Broadcasting case, the NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund described itself:
The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., is a non-profit corporation
formed to assist blacks to secure their constitutional and civil rights by means of
litigation. For many years attorneys of the Legal Defense Fund have represented par-
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The sudden explosion of discussion about sexual harassment after
Nina Totenberg's revelation of Anita Hill's allegations regarding
Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thomas" is another example of
an unbounded discussion substantively changed by the inclusion of
the experiences and perspectives of additional participants. The Senate Judiciary Committee's disposition of Professor Hill's allegations
may not have taken into account the possibility that a large number
of women might consider an allegation of sexual harassment highly
relevant to then-Judge Thomas's fitness to serve as a Supreme Court
Justice. In addition, the dispute over the definition of conduct that
constitutes sexual harassment and the beating of Hill's long silence
on the issue of her credibility are issues that cannot be resolved by
reference to foundational standards. Indeed, constitutional standards
as currently formulated would provide limited guidance and would
36
have limited applicability.
These two illustrations of normative openness suggest that access
to the processes in which consensus and norms develop may, in the
absence of any fundamental constitutional principles, be crucial to
the content of future norms, even if these norms lack constitutional
sanction. I have already illustrated the normative contest with the
example of the Griggs recodification in the context of the 1991 Act.
But there are other sites on which the contest over the scope of
equality is located.
D. Electoral Politics
Electoral politics is one such site on which the battle over the
meaning and content of equality has been waged. The image of
ties in litigation before (the Supreme] Court and the lower courts involving a variety
of race discrimination and remedial issues, including questions involving the proper
scope and interpretation of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments.
Brief Amicus Curiae for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. at 1-2, Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990) (No. 89-453), reprinted in 199 LANDMARK
BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

445, 456-57 (1991).
35. See All Things Considered (National Public Radio broadcast, Oct. 6, 1991).
36. The Court reaffirmed the Davis intentional-discrimination rule in Personnel Administrator
v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (refusing to strike down veteran-preference system in state hiring
procedures). Of course, to the extent that a public employer actually adopted a policy of sexual
harassment the harassment would be actionable. But the current statutory law of sexual harassment makes employers liable for the actions of employees in a wider range of circumstances than
constitutional law would require, see EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29
C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1991), and the law covers private employers who cannot be reached due to the
state-action limitation of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments.
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whites as "victims" of civil rights laws was reinforced by the imagery in television advertisements used by Senator Jesse Helms
against Harvey Gantt during the 1990 United States Senate race.
In the ad, white hands angrily crumpled an employer's rejection letter. The background voice-over suggested that Gantt supported a
civil rights bill that would take jobs away from whites. The now
infamous Willie Horton ad communicated a related idea of blacks
victimizing whites. These messages are as much a part of the process of defining equality norms as any legal contest that specifically
addresses the scope of equal protection.37 In fact, the extent to
which the language in certain judicial opinions seems to include parallel fears about black victimization of whites suggests that the discourse on equality norms is fluid across institutional boundaries.38 In
addition, events such as the emergence of Carol Moseley Braun's
candidacy for the United States Senate in Illinois also suggest that
the discourse on the meaning of equality does in fact occur outside
the parameters of legal doctrine; the Moseley Braun candidacy has
been widely interpreted as a sign that women-especially black
women-may define equality in terms of power sharing in powerful
institutions, not simply formal equality. A related message is the
suggestion that the Senate's decision to confirm Justice Thomas
in spite of Anita Hill's allegations was flawed in part due to the
composition of the Senate. This idea is both a statement that the
outcome may have been different had women been present as well
as a statement that institutional composition affects decisional
legitimacy. a9
E. Other "Opinion" Centers
Those institutions that shape the acceptance of formulated norms
play a more important role in today's normative vacuum than do the
legislative, judicial, and electoral institutions. Television and radio,
37. Of course, questions of equality have often played an important role in electoral politics.
See, e.g., ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 44 (campaign of

Vice President Johnson); id. at 62 (race issues in 1864 Louisiana constitutional convention); id. at
412-15 (race in post-Civil War elections in Mississippi, Texas, Tennessee, and Virginia); id. at
575-76 (Hayes-Tilden presidential election).
38. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495-96 (1988) (opinion of
O'Connor, J.) (discussing the relevance of the black majority on the Richmond City Council to
the adoption of strict scrutiny).
39. See YOUNG, supra note 5, at 91-95 (describing the relationship between justice and
democi atization).
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newspapers, popular magazines, and the academic press all contribute to the background against which norms are developed inside and
outside the political process. Television in particular, in light of its
pervasiveness as a medium of information/imagery exchange, wields
a disproportionate influence on the process of idea development.
Colleges and universities as well as important business institutions4 °
also shape the ideas that fill the Court-created normative vacuum.
The inclusion and discourse-democratization claims embodied in
multiculturalism have implications that transcend educational institutions. If the meaning of equality is indeed "up for grabs," the
decision-making processes in institutions that influence the development of opinion and knowledge ought to be more closely scrutinized
for their influence on the process of private and public norm
development.
II.

BEYOND MULTICULTURALISM-INCLUSION

ON NEW TERMS

While multiculturalism is metaphor for claims of inclusion, it
does not resolve questions related to legally imposed limitations on
inclusion or the terms upon which previously excluded groups might
be included. A much more thoughtful discussion of these issues is
necessary to evaluate what vision of multiculturalism might coincide
with or transcend current doctrinal limitations.
A.

Inclusion Rationales

There have been sharp doctrinal differences of opinion over both
the constitutional rationales for inclusion as well over the terms of
inclusion. The various opinions in Bakke, Croson, and Metro show
sharp doctrinal divisions over the appropriate terms of inclusion. At
the outset, it is important to recall that Justice Powell's own opinion
in Bakke seemed to reject racial pluralism as a legitimate basis for
inclusion. 41 A majority appears to reject affirmative inclusion mea40. The Fortune 100, for example, is composed of companies such as IBM and General Motors.
These companies are important centers of power and influence. The decision of the Leadership
Conference on Civil Rights to negotiate a compromise with the Business Roundtable on the deadlocked Civil Rights Act of 1990, H.R. 4000, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), illustrates the role that
major corporations play in shaping and limiting all policies, including equality-related policies.
See Govan, supra note 32, at 1076 (describing the negotiations between the Business Roundtable
and the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights).
41. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287-305 (1977) (opinion of Powell,
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sures based on the goal of eliminating societal discrimination, 2 at
least when state and local governments act." And Metro, a five-tofour decision, approved diversity as a substantial government interest," but the possibility that the concept of diversity might be expanded beyond broadcast diversity interests seems doubtful given
the outright rejection of this rationale by four Justices and the retirement of two members of the five-Justice majority." Remedying
provable, intentional racial discrimination seems a safe rationale in
light of Croson and Metro; the tragedy is that this rationale requires
an institutional admission of past illegality or proof of past illegality.
This element requires that the past of racial division be resurrected
before inclusive measures can be pursued. But the differences of
opinion are not surprising in light of the Court's historical ambivalence over the scope of constitutional equality and the severe limitations adopted. Severe doctrinal limitations on remedies of inclusion
are the flip-side of that limited constitutional vision.
The Metro debate over the legitimacy of broadcast diversity as a
government interest provided a provocative peek at the Justices'
views on the value of diversity. The dissenters' sharp dismissal of
diversity rationales as ill-conceived, "amorphous," and racist show
the extent to which the participatory and enrichment ideals embodied in multiculturalism would be rejected by at least four Justices.
B.

Empowerment

One question of importance is whether constitutional equality
doctrine will serve as a shield against empowering measures.
Metro's affirmation of measures to promote broadcast diversity increased the possibility that constitutional equality doctrine might
not preclude empowerment as a value. But Croson, which also was
an economic empowerment decision, severely limited state and local
governments in these efforts. Presley v. Etowah County Commis42. See supra note 25.
43. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 409, 520-21 (1988) (rejecting state or
local remedial efforts absent "imminent danger to life and limb").
44. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, I10 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
45. Justice Thomas replaced Justice Marshall, and Justice Souter replaced Justice Brennan.
Justice Thomas' decision in Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (striking down, on
equal protection grounds, FCC program of providing preferential treatment to female applicants
for broadcast licenses), indicates that he might limit application of the diversity rationale in different circumstances.
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sion,40 which held that a shift of authority away from offices to
which "first blacks" were elected did not violate the Voting Rights
Act of 1965,"1 exposed a significant difference of opinion on the relationship between formal voting rights and political empowerment. 8 Justice O'Connor joined the decision in Presley and yet
wrote inCroson that the exercise of legislative power by a black city
council majority provided a rationale for strict judicial scrutiny. 9
In Presley, the question was whether a transfer of power away
from an office slated to be held for the first time by newly elected
black officials was a change "with respect to voting" subject to
preapproval (or preclearance) by the United States Attorney General pursuant to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.50 Justice Kennedy, writing for Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia,
Souter, and Thomas, said that these changes were not changes with
respect to voting,"1 despite the effect of the transfers of power on the
authority of the newly elected black officials and their constituencies. Justice Kennedy's conclusion turned on a textually oriented interpretive approach-"with respect to voting" is plain language and
does not mean "with respect to governance." 52 The dissenters-Justices Stevens, White, and Blackmun-had urged the Court
to require preclearance when, as in Presley, the "reallocation of
decisionmaking authority of an elective office is taken (1) after the
victory of a black candidate, and (2) after the entry of a consent
decree designed to give black voters an opportunity to have repre46. 112 S. Ct. 820 (1992).
47. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973bb (1988).
48. This result-another example of narrowing statutory interpretation-is correctable through
legislation. After the ordeal accompanying the passage of the 1991 Act, see generally Govan,
supra note 32, it is unlikely that immediate correction will be sought.
49. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495-96 (1988) (opinion of O'Connor,
J.).
50. Presley, 112 S. Ct. at 824; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.
51. Id. at 832.
52. Justice Kennedy used similar plain-meaning reasoning in his Patterson decision. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989). There, the Court held that the language in
section 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988), guaranteeing "all persons . . . the same right . . . to
make and enforce contracts . . .as is enjoyed by white citizens" did not include the right to be
free from racial harassment in the performance of a contract. "The right to make contracts does
not extend, as a matter of either logic or semantics, to conduct by the employer after the contract
relation has been established, including breach of the terms of the contract or imposition of discriminatory working conditions." Patterson. 491 U.S. at 177. Patterson was overruled by Congress in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 101, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071-72
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988 & Supp. II 1991)).
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sentation on an elective body." 53 In essence, the Presley dissenters
argued that the reallocation of authority was so closely connected
with the black constituencies' exercise of the franchise as to warrant
preclearance lest those voting rights be nullified.5 '
Presley may be' limited in its ultimate impact because actions to
counter power-allocation shifts in anticipation of black office-holding
are actionable under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.5 5 And, the
decision, like so many recent Supreme Court civil rights rulings,
may be, overturned by Congress.5" But its empowerment implications are more important than the statutory interpretation debate
because the case reveals a majority indifferent to the relationship
between full citizenship and political empowerment.
The Presley Court's indifference to a white majority's reallocation
of increased power to itself decidedly contrasts with the Court's hostility towards the exercise of power by a government controlled by a
majority of black elected officials in Croson. In Croson, Justice
O'Connor's opinion specifically noted that strict judicial scrutiny
was necessary because the black majority Richmond City Council
had advantaged blacks." In addition, Justice Scalia wrote that state
and local governments must almost never be permitted to use race
to ameliorate past discrimination, among other things, on the basis
that local governments lack the dispassionate objectivity and flexibility to act responsibly in racial matters. The tone with respect to
Richmond in Croson is distinctly different from that adopted in
Presley. In Croson, federalism considerations are not only swept
aside, the local action is the subject of active suspicion. 58 The result
in each case is different but substantively consistent: Black political
empowerment is thwarted.
53. Presley, 112 S. Ct. at 839.
54. Id. at 840.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988).
56. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at scattered
sections of U.S.C.) (overturning six Supreme Court civil rights decisions from the 1988 Term).
See generally Govan, supra note 32.
57. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (opinion of O'Connor, J.).
In this respect, Justice O'Connor wrote for Justices Rehnquist, White, and Kennedy.
58. In Croson, Justice Scalia wrote that "It]he struggle for racial justice has historically been a
struggle by the national society against oppression in the individual States. . . . And the struggle
retains that character in modern times. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education." Id. at 522
(Scalia, i., concurring) (citations omitted).
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POLITICAL CORRECTNESS AND MULTICULTURALISM

The charge of "political correctness" ("PC") has been made at an
interesting time in the development of equality and inclusion norms.
On the one hand, the Court has articulated a limited vision of constitutional equality that affords little constitutional cover or legitimacy to groups seeking wider participation in society's institutions.
The constitutional equality norms are limited in scope as well as
application. On the other hand, the Supreme Court has legitimized
in constitutional terms the opposition to remedies that guarantee
participation opportunities for racial minorities. 9 These developments do not directly lead to the charge of being PC, but they certainly lend fuel to the fire of opposition to the claim of inclusion,
diversity, and respect that multiculturalism represents.
The narrow PC charge seems to be the claim that certain groups
want to discard the literary canon and replace it with a new canon
that includes the work of people of color and women.6" A more
sweeping message embodied in the PC charge is the claim that
women and minorities want to end tolerance and substitute an orthodoxy in place of open debate."' The opponents of PC cite campus
restrictions on hate speech as the quintessential example of this censorship.62 But they are also concerned that university officials are
stifling discussion of other topics in order to avoid offense to certain
groups.63 Thus, the proponents of the political correctness charge
ground their own message in a charge of censorship.
The PC charges and countercharges seem to create a fragile and
inadequate framework for a serious discussion of opportunity distribution. What sort of social consequences might flow from a frank
59. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 469; see also Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992) (approving
final dismissal of 1969 court-ordered school-desegregation decree in suburban Atlanta school
system).
60. Compare, e.g., Irving Howe, The Value of the Canon, NEw REPUBLIC, Feb. 18, 1991, at 40
(defending the program of classical Western education) and Roger Kimball, The Periphery v. the
Center: The MLA in Chicago, in DEBATING P.C., supra note 3, at 61 (same) with, e.g., Henry
Louis Gates, Jr., Whose Canon Is It Anyway?, in DEBATING P.C., supra note 3, at 190 (urging a
process of "canon reformation" leading to the definition of a "black American canon").
.61. See, e.g., D'Souza, Interview, supra note 4; see also Michael Kinsley, P.C. B.S., NEW REPUBLIC. May 20, 1991, at 8 (noting the extent of and questioning the foundations of "PC
hysteria").
62. See D'Souza, Interview, supra note 4, at 34-35; Nat Hentoff, 'Speech Codes' on Campus
and Problems of Free Speech, in DEBATING P.C., supra note 3, at 215, 221. But see Stanley Fish,
There's No Such Thing as Free Speech and It's a Good Thing Too, in DEBATING P.C., supra note
3,at 231 (defending hate speech codes as consistent with First Amendment principles).
63. See D'Souza, Interview, supra note 4, at 34.
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opposition to opportunity for women and minorities? And what if
opposition to hate speech rules were framed not as a slippery-slopeend-of-the-First-Amendment issue but as an affirmative espousal of
the opportunity to utter racist, sexist, and homophobic epithets? I
do not suggest the absence of gray areas. Proponents of affirmative
action do not suggest that there is no room for a discussion of the
circumstances under which affirmative action is appropriate. Proponents of hate-speech codes do not suggest that there are no disputes
with respect to differences between the sensitive-and often painful-discussion of race and the purposeful spitting out of a dehumanizing epithet to an eighteen-year-old away from home for the
first time. There are indeed degrees, but PC charges obscure both
substance as well as subtlety.
Moreover, those who charge PC implicitly deny the true power of
extant hierarchies. A false assumption of power and authority is incorporated into the PC charge. If women and minorities held the
important positions of power on campuses-faculty majorities and
key policymaking posts-the claim of silencing might be meritorious. In the absence of raw power, women and minorities may only
make legal and moral claims for inclusion and protection.
Often, and especially in the context of the debates over hate
speech on campus, the political correctness charge seems to prevent
a discussion about the formation of new norms about discourse. In
addition to the question of whether it is reasonable to do nothing at
all in response to a rising tide of hate crimes,64 is it reasonable to
deny the effect of unfettered hate speech on the very ability of members of maligned and disparaged groups to participate effectively in
any debate? This is not patronization but an acknowledgment of the
real effects of hate speech on the personal self esteem of those
maligned 65 as well as on the status of the groups in a larger sense.
The regulation of hate speech is justified, not only because of its
effect on specific people but also because of its effect on the speech
efficacy of members of maligned groups. 66 Creating a context in
64. See, e.g., Don Terry, "Pink Angels" Battle Anti-Gay Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1992, at
A18.
65. See Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story,
87 MIcH. L. REV. 2320 (1989).
66. Can we deny that our heritage of slavery diminishes the power of African-American speech
and taints and colors it with the imagery of slavery based on inferiority assertions? Put another
way, is it possible that our experience of slavery and its attendant and pervasive claim of our
inferiority does not influence the perceptions of whites about the value of African-American
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which all persons and groups have an opportunity to have their ideas
valued ought to be the prerequisite for any meaningful discourse at
all. The very values opponents of hate-speech regulation invoke-the
marketplace of ideas, for, example-are undermined when the
speech of certain groups is rendered irrelevant in an atmosphere of
hate and hostility.
So much of the PC discussion seems an effort to prevent discourse
democratization by precluding a discussion of the morality of opposition to inclusion. Indeed, perhaps it is the moral claim that is most
troubling and that accounts best for the crafting of a phrase that
obfuscates the moral issues of institutional legitimacy. After all, by
now-over 350 years after Jamestown-it may be possible to insist
that ruling majorities may not craft rules that exclude people of
color and women from sharing power.67
IV.

CONCLUSION

The core question of our era is inclusion, and the multiculturalism
debate symbolizes this question. The failure of the Supreme Court
to articulate a sweeping inclusive vision, and the Court's significant
restrictions on inclusive efforts, limit the role that both courts and
government might play in constructing a pluralist vision. The Court
has permitted Congress to legislate principles protective of equality,
but the normative vacuum created by the narrowness of the Court's
constitutional equality principles permits a spirited political contest
over the opportunity to define equality. In this normative vacuum,
the role of nonjudicial institutions in defining inclusion principles increases. Broad-based participation in these institutions becomes
more significant, the creation of a civil and tolerant environment for
a new "heterogeneous public" becomes more crucial, and the opposition to ideas of presumptive inclusion-whether framed in a PC
charge or in more significant ways-become more troubling.
But the cry for multiculturalism is not simply a symbolic demand
for inclusion; it is also a cry for inclusion with empowerment. Here,
too, opposition to inclusion is not easily separated from opposition to
speech?
67. This proposition is certainly as plausible as the Croson principle that the nascent exercise of
power by blacks to benefit themselves to a limited extent while permitting whites overall economic
control (through unlimited prime contracting opportunities) of a multimillion-dollar contracting

business justifies strict judicial scrutiny. See supra note 38 (noting Justice O'Connor's finding in
Croson that the majority of the Richmond City Council's being black militated in favor of applying strict scrutiny to the program of inclusion).
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empowerment. Presley demonstrates the distance legal doctrine
must travel to reach an empowering vision. More importantly, however, the result in Presley alerts us to the poverty of a vision of
inclusion without a vision of empowerment.

